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I. INTRODUCTION
Consumer welfare is the common concern of antitrust laws and the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices—Consumer Protection Act (DTPA).1
* B.A., Brandeis University; J.D., UC Hastings College of the Law; Partner,
Pulman, Cappuccio, Pullen & Benson LLP, San Antonio, Texas.
** B.A., Texas Tech University; J.D., Texas A&M University School of Law; Associ-
ate, Pulman, Cappuccio, Pullen & Benson LLP, San Antonio, Texas.
1. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41–17.63 (West 2011 & Supp. 2016). Section
17.50 of the DTPA provides:
(a) A consumer may maintain an action where any of the following consti-
tute a producing cause of economic damages or damages for mental
anguish:
(1) the use or employment by any person of a false, misleading, or de-
ceptive act or practice that is:
(A) specifically enumerated in a subdivision of Subsection (b) of
Section 17.46 of this subchapter; and
(B) relied on by a consumer to the consumer’s detriment;
(2) breach of an express or implied warranty;
(3) any unconscionable action or course of action by any person; or
(4) the use or employment by any person of an act or practice in viola-
tion of Chapter 541, Insurance Code.
15
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Antitrust, however, is primarily addressed to the misuse of market power
to harm consumers, while the DTPA focuses on consumer harm brought
about through deception.2 Antitrust laws and the DTPA, therefore, are
best viewed as focusing on complementary aspects of consumer welfare.
This article covers significant developments under the federal and
Texas antitrust laws and the DTPA during the Survey period—December
1, 2015 through November 30, 2016.
II. ANTITRUST
A. FEDERAL PLEADING STANDARDS
Most of the reported antitrust cases from federal courts in Texas during
the Survey period concern pleading standards. For example, in Red Lion
Medical Safety, Inc. v. General Electric Co.,3 the plaintiffs alleged claims
for violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act arising from the servicing of General Electric (GE) anesthe-
sia gas machines. According to the plaintiffs, who service the machines in
competition with GE, GE entered into an exclusive distributorship agree-
ment for replacement parts with Alpha Source in early 2011, which re-
quired the plaintiffs to purchase replacement parts from Alpha Source.
The plaintiffs further alleged that Alpha Source’s mark-up was 18–20%
and that Alpha Source engaged in anticompetitive behavior by failing to
stock some parts, delaying shipment of parts, and charging a premium
when parts had to be expedited. These problems are not faced by GE
when it services the machines itself. The plaintiffs alleged that they were
no longer able to compete with GE, which harmed the end users.4
Alpha Source and GE both filed motions to dismiss. As to Alpha
Source’s motion, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
held that the plaintiffs’ claims were “appropriately characterized as a
‘business dispute,’ such as a breach of contract” and that plaintiffs’ allega-
tions did not “present a plausible claim” of an antitrust violation.5 Re-
garding GE’s motion to dismiss, the district court held that the plaintiffs
had alleged a sufficient product and geographic market at this motion to
dismiss stage.6 The district court rejected GE’s argument that the plain-
tiffs’ Clayton Act claim was barred by the statute of limitations, holding
that the question required further factual development.7 Finally, the dis-
trict court rejected GE’s claim that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately
allege an agreement in restraint of trade and rejected as “unpersuasive”
GE’s “broad conclusions” that “an anti-trust violation cannot occur
where one party can provide a better deal to customers, where one com-
2. BUS. & COM. § 17.44(a); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979); Roy
B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir. 1994).
3. No. 2:15-CV-308, 2016 WL 3770958 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2016).
4. Id. at *1.
5. Id. at *3.
6. Id. at *4.
7. Id. at *3.
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pany refuses to help a competitor or where an exclusive distributorship is
involved.”8
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas was also faced
with challenges to the pleading of antitrust claims. YETI Coolers, LLC v.
RTIC Coolers, LLC 9 involved litigation between rival cooler companies.
YETI sued RTIC and its owners for patent infringement and RTIC coun-
terclaimed that YETI was monopolizing or attempting to monopolize the
market for “‘high-end premium heavy-duty coolers’ in the United
States.”10 YETI moved to dismiss, arguing that RTIC had failed to allege
facts to support a relevant market or anticompetitive conduct. The district
court held that RTIC had alleged sufficient facts “to define the relevant
product market” and that its “plausible factual assertions, taken as true,”
support its claim that YETI has monopoly power in that market.11 How-
ever, the district court concluded that RTIC had not sufficiently alleged
anticompetitive conduct.12 RTIC alleged that YETI had engaged in mer-
itless litigation and excluded “RTIC from access to Persico’s Smart Mold
electronic rotomolding technology.”13 Regarding the litigation, the dis-
trict court explained that litigation can only form the basis of an antitrust
claim when it is objectively baseless, which means “no reasonable litigant
could realistically expect success on the merits.”14 While RTIC had al-
leged that YETI’s patent was invalid and thus that its numerous patent
lawsuits were objectively baseless, the district court explained that none
of YETI’s other claims had been determined so it could not say that
YETI’s claims were objectively baseless.15 “Therefore, even accepting as
true all of RTIC’s factual allegations,” the district court found that RTIC
pleaded “insufficient facts to support the legal conclusion that YETI en-
gages in ‘sham’ litigation to exclude competition.”16 Turning to the allega-
tion that YETI’s exclusive arrangement with Persico constitutes
exclusionary conduct, the district court explained that “an exclusive deal-
ing contract does not violate the antitrust law ‘unless the court believes it
probable that performance of the contract will foreclose competition in a
substantial share of the line of commerce affected.’”17 Because RTIC had
failed to allege facts demonstrating that its lack of access to Persico ma-
chines had prevented RTIC from being able to compete with YETI, the
district court concluded that RTIC had failed to sufficiently plead an-
8. Id. at *3–4.
9. No. 1:15-CV-00597-RP, 2016 WL 5956081 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2016).
10. Id. at *1, *3.
11. Id. at *4.
12. Id. at *4–5.
13. Id. at *4.
14. Id. (quoting Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49,
60 (1993)).
15. Id.
16. Id. It is unclear why the district court was able at the motion to dismiss stage to
consider facts outside the pleadings, such as the status of YETI’s other patent infringement
claims.
17. Id. at *5 (quoting Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961)).
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ticompetitive conduct.18
WickFire, LLC v. Trimax Media, Inc.19 involved competitors in a spe-
cific search engine marketing arena that each claimed the other was com-
peting unlawfully. WickFire filed a motion to dismiss TriMax’s antitrust
counterclaim for failure to state a claim and the U. S. District Court for
the Western District of Texas granted the motion.20 The elements of an
attempted monopolization claim are “(1) . . . predatory or anti-competi-
tive conduct; (2) with the specific intent to monopolize; and (3) with a
dangerous probability of attaining monopoly power,” which itself con-
cerns a “defendant’s ability to lessen or destroy competition” in the rele-
vant market.21 The district court held that while TriMax had defined the
relevant product market, it failed to allege sufficient facts concerning the
size of the market, WickFire’s share of the market, the number of com-
petitors in the market, or the strength of those competitors.22 The district
court rejected TriMax’s contention that WickFire’s competitors “are too
weak to constrain Wickfire’s prices” as a “conclusory allegation” that was
“insufficient to establish WickFire holds market power.”23 In the absence
of these facts, TriMax failed to sufficiently “allege that WickFire [had] a
dangerous probability of attaining monopoly power,” and thus the district
court dismissed its antitrust claim.24
B. ATTEMPTED MONOPOLIZATION
In Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,25 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered a $340 million jury ver-
dict in a case between two manufacturers of syringes and IV catheters.
The case had gone to trial on four antitrust liability theories, each applica-
ble to three different products and two theories of damages: “anticompe-
titive contracting damages” and “deception damages.”26 The jury rejected
eleven of the antitrust claims but found the defendant liable for “at-
tempted monopolization of safety syringes and awarded in excess of $113
million in “deception damages,” which the district judge trebled.27
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the jury’s findings did not
support the verdict.28 Because the jury had rejected the “anticompetitive
contracting” theory of recovery, the plaintiff could recover only if its at-
tempted monopolization claim was supported by evidence of “decep-
tion.”29 The plaintiff alleged three types of deception: patent
18. Id.
19. No. A-14-CA-34-SS, 2016 WL 4119917 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2016).
20. Id. at *8.
21. Id. at *6 (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillian, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993)).
22. Id. at *7.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 842 F.3d 883 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1349 (2017).
26. Id. at 890.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 891.
29. Id.
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infringement, persistent false advertising, and “tainting the market.”30
The Fifth Circuit explained that “[not] all ‘unfair’ conduct” by a rival is
actionable as predatory or exclusionary conduct for antitrust purposes.31
While the Fifth Circuit agreed with the plaintiff’s contention that “unfair
practices can be aggregated into legally predatory conduct,” it stated that
not since 1980, in Associated Radio Service Co. v. Page Airways, Inc.,32
had the Fifth Circuit concluded that a series of business torts were “so
egregious as to constitute actionable predatory or exclusionary
conduct.”33
Turning to the facts of the case, the Fifth Circuit reiterated its long-
standing position that patent infringement cannot support an antitrust
claim.34 Patent laws are designed to allow inventors the “exclusive right
to exploit their discoveries,” while antitrust law is intended to protect
consumers and commerce.35 Contrary to harming commerce, patent in-
fringement actually increases competition because the infringer “invades
the patentee’s monopoly rights, causing competing products to enter the
market.”36
Regarding the plaintiff’s attempt to rest antitrust liability on its rival’s
false advertising “that [defendant’s] needles are the ‘world’s sharpest’ . . .
and have ‘low waste space,’” the Fifth Circuit explained that advertising
“on the merits” is consistent with competition and that “arguments relat-
ing to the merits of a product do not raise antitrust concerns.”37
“[A]bsent a demonstration that a competitor’s false advertisements had
the potential to eliminate, or did in fact eliminate, competition, an anti-
trust lawsuit will not lie.”38 The Fifth Circuit recognized that other cir-
cuits had flatly barred or “treated skeptically antitrust claims predicated
on false advertising.”39 Because the plaintiff remained a vigorous compet-
itor and failed to adduce any evidence that the defendant’s false advertis-
ing harmed competition, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff could not
premise its antitrust claim on false advertising.40
30. Id. at 891.
31. Id. at 891–92.
32. 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980).
33. Retractable Techs., Inc., 842 F.3d at 892.
34. Id. at 892–93.
35. Id. at 893.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 893–94 (citing Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518,
523–25 (5th Cir. 1999)).
38. Id. at 895.
39. Id. at 894–96 (citing Mercatus Grp., LLC v. Lake Forest Hosp., 641 F.3d 834, 851
(7th Cir. 2011); W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 109 n.14 (3d
Cir. 2010); Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666, 674–75 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 376 F.3d 1065, 1076
(11th Cir. 2004); Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of
Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 323 F.3d 366, 370 (6th Cir. 2003); Am. Prof’l Testing Serv., Inc. v.
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof’l Publ’ns, Inc., 108 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir.
1997); Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904, 916 (2d Cir. 1988)).
40. Id. at 896–97.
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The plaintiff’s final theory was that the defendant had intentionally
marketed flawed retractable syringes with the intent of convincing con-
sumers that all retractable syringes were unreliable so that when the
plaintiff’s patent expired, the defendant could unveil a new product using
the plaintiff’s technology and corner the market. The Fifth Circuit held
that there was some basis in the record that the defendant was marketing
flawed products but no direct evidence that it did so in order to taint the
market.41 The plan to use a rival’s technology to compete once its patent
has expired “is precisely the type of activity to be expected from competi-
tors when valuable patent rights expire” and thus “cannot constitute an-
ticompetitive conduct.”42 Nor did it make sense to the court that the
defendant would intentionally harm the market for retractable syringes.
Calling such a plan “unnecessary and counterproductive to the company’s
longer-term goal,” the Fifth Circuit held that such a plan “utterly belies
the taint theory.”43 The Fifth Circuit thus concluded that the tainting the-
ory could not support the jury’s verdict.44
C. TEXAS FREE ENTERPRISE AND ANTITRUST ACT
In Regal Entertainment Group v. iPic-Gold Class Entertainment,
LLC,45 the First Houston Court of Appeals considered whether a tempo-
rary restraining order had properly been issued in an antitrust suit be-
tween movie theater chains. iPic operates a “boutique upscale movie
theater” in Houston.46 According to iPic, a year before the location
opened, “Regal informed six major film distributors that . . . [it] would be
‘clearing’ iPic Houston” for its Greenway location, which was nearest to
iPic.47 In film parlance, “clearing” or “clearance” means that Regal would
not license a film for the Greenway theater that would be simultaneously
shown at iPic. Once it opened, iPic sued Regal alleging that Regal had
violated the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983 (TFEAA)
because Regal has sufficient market power to force film distributors to
comply with clearance and that the clearance request harms both iPic and
the “market for premium exhibition of first-run films” by limiting con-
sumer choice in locations to view such films.48
iPic requested temporary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting
the defendants from clearing the iPic Houston theater. The trial court
held a hearing on iPic’s request for a temporary injunction at which evi-
dence was taken that the clearance request was made, that three of the six
distributors contacted responded by allocating their films between Regal
and iPic, meaning that some films were offered only to Regal and others
41. Id. at 897–98.
42. Id. at 897.
43. Id. 898.
44. Id.
45. 507 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
46. Id. at 342.
47. Id. at 343.
48. Id. at 342–43.
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only to iPic, and the other three ignored it and offered films to both thea-
ters, but Regal refused to exhibit any films licensed to iPic. iPic’s execu-
tive further testified that iPic’s Houston location was unable to obtain
licenses to some of the films it wanted, thereby preventing Houston cus-
tomers from being able to “see certain films in a premium theater set-
ting.”49 iPic offered evidence that Regal’s Greenway theater and iPic do
not substantially compete because their average ticket prices are signifi-
cantly different ($9 for Greenway and $21–$28 for iPic) and because iPic
attracts customers who do not patronize traditional megaplexes like the
Greenway. Regal presented evidence that the clearance around iPic was
consistent with Regal’s nationwide policy and that clearance actually has
“pro-competitive benefits” in that it “increase[s] film supply and en-
sure[s] that different films get played.”50 Regal also countered iPic’s
claim of damage with evidence that despite the clearance, iPic Houston
was the chain’s second-highest grossing theater and had obtained numer-
ous box-office hits. The trial court issued a temporary injunction prohibit-
ing Regal from “requesting exclusive film licenses . . . from any studio,”
and Regal appealed.51
The court of appeals affirmed entry of the temporary injunction.52 The
court first considered the case law regarding film clearance requests. Re-
gal argued that the trial court had erroneously granted injunctive relief on
the sole ground that the Greenway and iPic Houston were not in substan-
tial competition. The court of appeals rejected this argument, recognizing
that “[w]hether theaters are in substantial competition turns on whether
they sell a reasonably interchangeable product in the same geographic
area.”53 The court of appeals then considered whether iPic had demon-
strated a probable right to recovery on its claim of an unlawful restraint
of trade. The court of appeals rejected Regal’s contention that its clear-
ance request was unilateral, and thus could not constitute an agreement
in restraint of trade.54 Evidence that three of the film distributors allo-
cated films between the competitors when doing so was not in their eco-
nomic self-interest, and that Regal declined to show Star Wars: The Force
Awakens, because it was playing at iPic Houston, was sufficient evidence
to permit “a rational inference of conspiracy or coercion as opposed to
permissible independent conduct.”55 Regarding the product market, the
court of appeals concluded that despite conflicting evidence, there was
some evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Regal and iPic
competed in the market for first-run film licenses in a three-mile radius
around the two theaters and that Regal had market power sufficient to
49. Id. at 343.
50. Id. at 344.
51. Id. at 345.
52. Id. at 342.
53. Id. at 348–49 (collecting cases).
54. Id. at 350.
55. Id.
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harm competition in that market.56 The court of appeals also identified
some evidence to support the trial court’s implied findings “that iPic
Houston participates in the premium film exhibition market to the exclu-
sion of the Greenway” and that “Regal’s clearance request reduced the
number of first-run films available to consumers in that market.”57
In Better Business Bureau of Metropolitan Houston, Inc. v. John Moore
Services, Inc.,58 the First Houston Court of Appeals considered whether a
home repair business had cited clear and specific evidence of its antitrust
claims against the Houston Better Business Bureau (BBB) sufficient to
withstand a challenge under the Texas Citizens’ Participation Act
(TCPA). Plaintiff business pleaded restraint of trade and attempted mo-
nopolization under TFEAA, alleging, among other things, that a compet-
ing business and the BBB had conspired to restrain trade in the home
repair market by giving the plaintiff a bad rating and, ultimately, forcing
the plaintiff out of the BBB. The court of appeals held that the plaintiff
had failed to identify any evidence of an agreement to restrain trade in
violation of TFEAA, evidence of any anticompetitive conduct by the
BBB requiring other businesses to follow its recommendations, evidence
of any injury or damage caused by its negative rating or lack of member-
ship in the BBB, or evidence of an adverse effect on home services com-
petition.59 Thus, dismissal of the business’s restraint of trade claim under
the TCPA was appropriate. The court of appeals held that the business’s
attempted monopolization claim was likewise insufficiently supported to
survive the TCPA challenge because the business had proffered no evi-
dence of the parameters of the relevant market, no evidence of the de-
fendants’ market share in that market, and no evidence of predatory
conduct resulting in a “dangerous possibility of monopoly power.”60
III. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES – CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT
Noteworthy DTPA decisions during the Survey period considered
whether DTPA claims survive a consumer who dies; whether purchasers
of non-operator working interests fall within the statute’s scope as “con-
sumers”; whether a limited liability company qualifies as a “consumer”
for DTPA purposes; whether alleged violations of Federal Trade Com-
mission franchise rules constitute per se violations of the DTPA; whether
constructive notice through real property records that is improper as a
defense to a DTPA claim may still constitute notice for purposes of the
discovery rule; and whether a DTPA judgment is dischargeable in bank-
56. Id. at 351–52.
57. Id. at 354.
58. 500 S.W.3d 26 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
59. See id. at 32 (“Concluding that we do, we examine whether the requirements for
dismissal under the TCPA have been met in the second state court lawsuit. We conclude
that they have.”).
60. Id. at 47–49.
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ruptcy where the jury’s findings are vague regarding the degree of intent
to deceive.
A. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
The Texas Legislature amended the DTPA in 2015 to prohibit an addi-
tional species of “deceptive practice” involving misleading consumers to
believe that notaries may practice law.61 Specifically, the Legislature de-
clared it a deceptive practice to
us[e] the translation into a foreign language of a title or other word,
including “attorney,” “lawyer,” “licensed,” “notary,” and “notary
public,” in any written or electronic material, including an advertise-
ment, a business card, a letterhead, stationery, a website, or an on-
line video, in reference to a person who is not an attorney in order to
imply that the person is authorized to practice law in the United
States.62
The inclusion of this new prohibition reflects a trend in which notaries
public identify themselves as a “notario publico,” which in Mexico and
other Latin American countries means the person is an attorney, which is
not necessarily the case in the United States.63 The false cognate inherent
to the literal translation of “notary” to “notario” has in some instances
led unaware consumers to seek immigration and other legal advice from
unqualified individuals.64
B. SURVIVABILITY
At least one federal court case continued an apparent trend in the in-
terpretation of Texas law and held that a deceased consumer’s survivors
may not bring a DTPA claim belonging to the late consumer. Although
Texas intermediate courts sometimes differ on the issue65 and the Texas
Supreme Court has yet to weigh in,66 federal cases at least indicate that
61. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.46(b)(28). The new section took effect September 1,
2015.
62. Id.
63. See Rodriguez v. State, 336 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet.
ref’d) (“[I]n Mexico a ‘notario publico’ is a licensed attorney[.]”); see also S. Comm. on St.
Aff., Bill Analysis, C.S.H.B. 2573, 85th Leg., R.S. (2015), http://www.legis.texas.gov/
tlodocs/84R/analysis/html/HB02573E.htm [https://perma.cc/AXY3-V6AE].
64. Fight Notario Fraud, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/
immigration/projects_initiatives/fightnotariofraud.html [https://perma.cc/M9EX-PH7U].
65. Compare, e.g., Thomes v. Porter, 761 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1988, no writ) (finding that, pursuant to common law rules and “liberally construing the
purpose of the DTPA,” claims do survive a consumer), and Mahan Volkswagen, Inc. v.
Hall, 648 S.W.2d 324, 333 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.), with
Lukasik v. San Antonio Blue Haven Pools, Inc., 21 S.W.3d 394, 402 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2000, no pet.) (finding that DTPA claims do not survive, expressly rejecting
Thomes).
66. Shell Oil Co. v. Chapman, 682 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. 1984) (“We do not pass upon
this point, and reserve to another day discussion of survival of DTPA damages.”). The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit later certified the question to the Texas Supreme
Court, which declined to issue guidance. Wellborn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 970 F.2d 1420,
1422 (5th Cir. 1992).
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such is the rule in Texas.
In Elmazouni v. Mylan, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Texas held that the heirs of deceased consumers may not bring
DTPA claims because such claims “do not survive the death of the con-
sumer.”67 The husband and children of Lisa Elmazouni (the survivors)
brought a claim against pharmaceutical company Mylan following her
death, which the survivors alleged was caused by a pain medication man-
ufactured by Mylan.68 The survivors’ claims included strict product liabil-
ity and DTPA violations.69 Mylan moved for dismissal of the DTPA
claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).70 The dis-
trict court dismissed the DTPA claims71 after noting that, although “there
is no consensus on that issue among the intermediate state appellate
courts,” the district court had previously held that such claims do not sur-
vive and the district court would therefore reaffirm such an interpretation
in the present case.72
Because the DTPA itself is silent on survivability, courts adjudicating
that aspect of DTPA claims have turned to the common law for guidance.
Decisions holding that DTPA claims do not survive the consumer’s death
have typically turned on the punitive and personal nature of the statutory
scheme. As one oft-cited authority for the non-survivability of DTPA
claims explains, “[a]t common law, actions affecting primarily property
and property rights survived, whereas an action asserting a purely per-
sonal right terminated with the death of the aggrieved party.”73 Thus, a
DTPA claim, which the courts have deemed personal in nature, does not
survive the consumer. This approach gained further support by the Texas
Supreme Court’s reasoning in PPG Industries, Inc. v. JMB/Houston Cen-
ters Partners Ltd., where the supreme court held that DTPA claims are
67. Elmazouni v. Mylan, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-00574-M, 2016 WL 7105021, at *7 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 1, 2016).
68. Id. at *1.
69. Id.
70. Id. at *2.
71. The trial court first found that the plaintiffs had abandoned their DTPA claims and
dismissed them on those grounds before going on to address survivability anyway. Id. at
*6–7.
72. Id. at *7 (citing Boudreaux v. Corium Int’l, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-2644-M, 2013 WL
1890269, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 2013) (Lynn, J.); Lofton v. McNeil Consumer & Specialty
Pharm., 682 F. Supp. 2d 662, 680 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (Lindsay, J.); Launius v. Allstate Ins.
Co., No. 3:06-CV-0579-B, 2007 WL 1135347, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2007) (Boyle, J.).
Other Texas federal cases finding that DTPA claims do not survive the consumer’s death
include Malvino v. Delluniversita, No. 2:12-CV-401, 2015 WL 2401507, at *5 (S.D. Tex.
May 20, 2015), and McCoy v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:09-CV-496, 2010 WL 3365284, at *5 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 3, 2010) (“The Court finds . . . that the DTPA claim does not survive the death of
the consumer.”), rep. and recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 3365110 (E.D. Tex. Aug.
25, 2010), rev’d, 840 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 2016). In October 2016, the Fifth Circuit reviewed
the Malvino court’s holding on appeal but did not address the survivability of DTPA and
instead focused its analysis on the survivability of claims under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Malvino v. Delluniversita, 840 F.3d 223, 226–27
(5th Cir. 2016) (“After a bench trial, the district court dismissed the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act claims on the ground that they did not survive Pereida’s death.”).
73. First Nat’l Bank of Kerrville v. Hackworth, 673 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1984, no writ) (citing Johnson v. Rolls, 79 S.W. 513, 514 (Tex. 1904)).
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not assignable as a result of their being personal and punitive in nature.74
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas later extended
this reasoning to survivability, holding that “[e]xtending the holding of
PPG Industries to the survivor context is warranted by Texas law.”75
In contrast, decisions holding that DTPA claims do survive the con-
sumer have looked to the common law causes of action for fraud, breach
of contract, and torts, of which the DTPA is an “amalgam.”76 As the most
frequently cited case in support of survivability noted, common law
claims sounding in contract, tort, and property all survived the claimant,
meaning that, “liberally construing the purpose of the DTPA, it is obvious
that a cause of action under the DTPA should survive the death of the
consumer.”77
Regardless of the strength of each of these arguments, the more recent
federal cases interpreting Texas law, including the most recent Elmazouni
case, reflect a growing consensus that a DTPA claim does not survive the
wronged consumer’s death.
C. “CONSUMER”
A claimant bringing a DTPA claim may prevail only if he or she estab-
lishes “consumer” status under the statute.78 The DTPA defines “con-
sumer,” in relevant part, as “an individual, partnership, corporation, this
state, or a subdivision or agency of this state who seeks or acquires by
purchase or lease, any goods or services.”79 Two holdings issued during
the Survey period addressed the applicability of this definition—and thus
the applicability of the DTPA. The first involved a question of whether
mineral interest holders may, in some circumstances, qualify as “consum-
ers.”80 The second involved the question of whether a limited liability
company (LLC), which is not expressly enumerated in the statutory defi-
nition, may qualify as a “consumer” for DTPA purposes.81 These cases
are addressed in turn.
74. PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Hous. Ctrs. Partners Ltd., 146 S.W.3d 79, 82, 89 (Tex.
2004) (“[T]he most important role of the DTPA is the remedies it adds, not the ones it
duplicates. Economic damages and attorney’s fees are certainly remedial, but they were
recoverable in contract and warranty long before the DTPA was passed. The DTPA adds
mental anguish and punitive damages—damages that could hardly be more personal.”).
75. Launius v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 3:06-CV-0579-B, 2007 WL 1135347, at *5 (N.D.
Tex. Apr. 17, 2007).
76. See, e.g., Thomes v. Porter, 761 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, no
writ).
77. Id.
78. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44(a) (West 2011).
79. Id. § 17.45(4).
80. In re Primera Energy, LLC, 560 B.R. 448, 465 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2016).
81. Woods v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. 4:15-CV-00536, 2016 WL 890676, at *1–3 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 8, 2016).
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1. In re Primera Energy, LLC—Mineral Interest Purchasers as
Consumers
In re Primera Energy, LLC raised the question of whether, for pur-
poses of dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),82 the
DTPA applies to non-operator working mineral interest owners who pur-
chased a financial stake in oil and gas drilling operations from defend-
ants, the wells’ actual operator.83 Distinguishing the instant case from two
other cases holding to the contrary, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Texas held that the plaintiff investors/mineral interest
owners brought a colorable claim under the DTPA as consumers.84
The plaintiffs purchased investment stakes in various Texas oil and gas
wells from Primera Energy, LLC (Primera), an entity that owned no
equipment and outsourced all drilling activities using the investors’
money.85 Investors, who were individuals and entities whom Primera
solicited via telephone, each paid Primera approximately $100,000 in
three installments in exchange for a 1% working interest in a particular
well, a hybrid property interest and financial product that Primera called
a “unit.”86 The investors’ installments would flow into Primera’s operat-
ing account for the respective wells, at which point a portion was
siphoned off to Primera’s general operating account for the payment of
general expenses not associated with any one well and for the compensa-
tion of Primera’s executives and vendors.87 The bankruptcy court briefly
noted that some evidence suggested that some “investor monies were
used to pay expenses for wells other than the well in which those monies
were invested,” meaning Primera may have intermingled its well-specific
accounts.88 The bankruptcy court noted that “Primera’s primary source of
revenue is from investor contributions and it appears from the evidence
presented at the hearing that only a small fraction of the revenue Primera
received is from oil and gas production.”89 Investors ultimately sued
Primera and its executives in state court for a variety of causes of action,
including DTPA claims, a lawsuit that was later removed to the bank-
ruptcy court as an adversary proceeding after Primera filed for Chapter
11.90
82. Rule 12(b)(6) is made applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings pursuant to
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012(b).
83. In re Primera Energy, LLC, 560 B.R. at 464–65.
84. Id. at 465.
85. In re Primera Energy, LLC (Primera II), No. 15-51396-CAG, 2015 WL 6556887, at
*2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2015). The bankruptcy court’s holding on the motion to
dismiss contains a sparse recantation of the facts. Therefore, certain facts are instead drawn
from an earlier holding in the case where the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for prelim-




89. Id. at *3.
90. In re Primera Energy, LLC, 560 B.R. 448, 454 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2016).
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In its dismissal pleadings, Primera argued, in relevant part, that the
court should dismiss the DTPA claims because its “consumer” definition
disqualified plaintiffs from recovery.91 Primera cited C & C Partners v.
Sun Exploration & Production Co.92 and Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas
Corp.,93 two Texas intermediate appellate court decisions that held that
non-operating mineral interest owners cannot bring claims as “consum-
ers” under the DTPA.94 The bankruptcy court rejected Primera’s argu-
ment and distinguished the two cases, reasoning that plaintiffs’ pleadings,
taken as true, alleged that Primera removed certain “joint venture” lan-
guage in the written agreements and that the underlying agreements were
generally unlike the standard joint-operating agreements before the two
Texas appellate courts because plaintiffs alleged that Primera “offered
and sold units of real property interests and services to Plaintiffs.”95 The
bankruptcy court further noted that Primera had in fact “offered and sold
real property interests and services” to plaintiffs because, unlike in a joint
venture arrangement, Primera and the executives were “not simply reim-
bursed for their costs incurred on behalf of all owners, and Defendants
were not simply the ‘front man’ for the investors.”96
The bankruptcy court’s holding in In re Primera Energy, LLC illus-
trates the importance of a case-by-case, fact-by-fact analysis that must
inform a determination of whether a plaintiff is a “consumer” under the
DTPA.97
2. Woods v. U.S. Bank, N.A.—LLCs as “Consumers”
In Woods v. U.S. Bank, N.A., the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas held what might have previously been obvious—LLCs
may qualify as “consumers” under the DTPA despite Section 17.45’s fail-
ure to list them alongside “individual[s], partnership[s], [and] corpora-
tion[s].”98 The Woods decision, however, also might have left the door
open to a future challenge to DTPA claims brought by LLCs because it
noted in passing that the Texas legislature’s failure to add LLCs to the
DTPA’s express language might give rise to a statutory ambiguity—which
the Woods court arguably failed to address.99
Woods involved DTPA claims brought by an LLC and one of its mem-
bers against U.S. Bank (USB) and several other entities and individuals
91. Id. at 464.
92. 783 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied).
93. 648 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
94. In re Primera Energy, LLC, 560 B.R. at 464–65 (discussing C & C Partners, 783
S.W.2d at 712–13; Hamilton, 648 S.W.2d at 322).
95. Id. at 465.
96. Id.
97. The ultimate determination, however, is one of law to be made by the trial court.
See Burroughs v. APS Int’l, Ltd., 93 S.W.3d 155, 163 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2002, pet. denied) (“Whether a plaintiff is a consumer is a question of law.”).
98. Woods v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. 4:15-CV-00536, 2016 WL 890676, at *1–2 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 8, 2016) (slip. op., not designated for publication) (discussing TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (West 2011)).
99. Id. at *2.
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in Texas state court, which USB removed to federal court based on diver-
sity jurisdiction.100 USB opposed the plaintiffs’ attempts to remand, argu-
ing that, although the LLC shared citizenship with several of the
individual defendants, no diversity would exist where the diversity-de-
feating party was not properly named as a plaintiff or defendant in the
lawsuit.101 USB’s theory was that the LLC could not be a proper plaintiff
because the DTPA’s definition of “consumer” does not state that such an
entity may bring a DTPA claim.
The district court rejected USB’s reasoning, at least for purposes of
determining diversity jurisdiction, and attributed LLCs’ absence from the
“consumer” definition to the fact that the Legislature enacted the DTPA
in 1973, prior to Texas’s statutory creation of LLCs in 1991.102 The district
court first rejected USB’s argument that the legislature, by failing to
amend the DTPA to include LLCs in the “consumer” definition after
1991, intended to exclude LLCs from the definition because USB failed
to cite to any authority for the proposition.103 Next, the district court re-
jected USB’s argument that likened Section 17.45 to Section 38.001 of the
Texas Civil Remedies & Practice Code, which exhaustively lists eight
types of claims for which a party may recover attorneys’ fees from “an
individual or corporation” but that is silent on whether one may recover
from an LLC.104 USB relied on the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Texas’s recent holding in Hoffman v. L & M Arts that Section
38.001’s omission of LLCs precludes recovery of attorneys’ fees from
those entities,105 but the district court also rejected that argument as “un-
convincing” and Hoffman’s guidance as “not on point.”106
The district court explained that the Hoffman decision turned on the
Northern District’s conclusion, based on a broader reading of various
statutes in other codes that define “individual” to mean only humans and
“corporations” as only those specific types of entities, that the statute’s
exclusion of LLCs was intentional, whereas the DTPA contains no com-
parable “definitional distinctions.”107 Considering that the DTPA’s defi-
nition of “consumer” was inclusive enough for both corporations
(entities) and individuals (humans) and that the DTPA predated LLCs in
Texas, the district court held that it “cannot agree that the omission of
LLC is indicative of any intent by the Texas legislature to purposefully
100. Id. at *1.
101. Id. (addressing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2012)).
102. Id. at *2.
103. Id.
104. Id. (discussing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (West 2014)).
105. Hoffman v. L & M Arts, No. 3:10-CV-0953-D, 2015 WL 1000838, at *7 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 6, 2015) (mem. op.), aff’d, 838 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding, after reviewing legis-
lative history and applying rules of statutory construction, that “the plain meaning of the
term ‘individual’ does not include business entities such as LLCs, and, accordingly . . . the
Supreme Court of Texas would not interpret the term ‘individual’ in [Section] 38.001 to
include an LLC.”).
106. Woods, 2016 WL 890676, at *2.
107. Id.
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exclude an LLC from the definition of consumer.”108 The district court
also noted that “courts must liberally construe and apply” the DTPA for
the policy purpose of protecting consumers, regardless of the plaintiff’s
corporate or corporeal form.109 But before moving on to the next issue,
the district court mused that, at any rate, “to the extent that this issue
represents an ambiguity in state law, it further supports the appropriate-
ness of remand.”110
The district court’s casual mention that an ambiguity potentially exists
with respect to whether an LLC qualifies as a consumer for DTPA pur-
poses might leave just enough toehold for a subsequent challenge to an
LLC’s DTPA claims against a defendant. This is especially true in light of
arguable flaws in the Woods court’s reasoning. First, regarding the legisla-
ture’s intent, it might be more persuasive that it has declined to update
the “consumer” definition for more than twenty-five years since LLCs
entered the Texas business market. After all, perhaps it is probative that
the legislature intentionally declined to employ in the consumer defini-
tion the term “person,” which the DTPA defines in the immediately pre-
ceding subsection as “an individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other group, however organized.”111 Second, the DTPA arguably does
contain the same “definitional distinctions” as Section 38.001 because the
grounds that the Hoffman court used to conclude that “individual” must
mean only human beings is similarly available to a court parsing the
meaning of “consumer.”112 Thus, just as Section 38.001 permits recovery
from individuals and corporations only, Section 17.45 permits DTPA
claims brought by “individual[s], partnership[s], or corporation[s]” only—
terms that, by both the Woods and Hoffman courts’ reasoning, would all
exclude LLCs.113 Third, the Legislature directed Texas courts to “liberally
construe[ ]” Section 38.001, just as it did with the DTPA.114
These potential flaws in the Woods court’s reasoning, combined with its
own suggestion that its reasoning might not have settled the question,
might leave room in later cases for the argument that Texas does not, in
fact, yet permit LLCs to qualify as “consumers” under the DTPA—par-
ticularly so if the presiding court does not have available to it the remand-
related pleading deference that at least partially swayed the Woods
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Rico v. Flores, 481 F.3d 234, 244 (5th Cir. 2007)).
111. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(3) (West 2011) (emphasis added).
112. See Woods, 2016 WL 890676, at *2; Hoffman v. L & M Arts, No. 3:10-CV-0953-D,
2015 WL 1000838, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2015) (mem. op.), aff’d, 838 F.3d 568 (5th Cir.
2016) (analyzing the Texas Business Organizations Code to interpret a word contained in
the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code); see also TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 1.002
(38) (West 2012) (“‘Individual’ means a natural person.”). Presumably, nothing would pre-
vent a court from doing the same to inform its interpretation of the Texas Business &
Commerce Code.
113. BUS. & COM. § 17.45(4).
114. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.005 (West 2015) (“This chapter shall be
liberally construed to promote its underlying purposes.”).
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D. FEDERAL REGULATIONS AS DTPA TIE-INS
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the issue of
whether a violation of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) franchise regula-
tions constitutes a violation of the DTPA in Yumilicious Franchise,
L.L.C. v. BarrieEyeglasses, a case that explores the bounds of the
DTPA’s ambit through tie-in statutes.116
When a Texas franchisor, Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. (Yumi), sued a
South Carolina franchisee, Why Not, L.L.C. (WN), WN counterclaimed
for a litany of alleged violations of the DTPA, including a claim that
Yumi’s failure to comply with FTC disclosure requirements constitutes a
violation of the Texas Business Opportunities Act (TBOA),117 which in
turn is a tie-in statute to the DTPA.118 The trial court dismissed WN’s
TBOA/DTPA claims for failure to state a claim.119 On appeal to the Fifth
Circuit, WN asserted that noncompliance with the FTC rules are “a per se
violation of the [TBOA]” and, consequently, the DTPA.120 The Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal.121
The Fifth Circuit noted at the outset that FTC disclosure law “does not
provide for private causes of action.”122 The Fifth Circuit then explained
that, although the TBOA does provide that violations of its provisions
constitute a DTPA tie-in claim, neither federal laws nor the TBOA go so
far as to incorporate FTC rule violations as a Texas state law violation.123
WN argued that such an incorporation does exist through a provision
within the TBOA providing that courts, to the extent possible, shall “fol-
low the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission” regard-
ing federal trade laws.124 However, the Fifth Circuit rejected WN’s boot-
strap argument and held that such language does not itself provide a pri-
vate cause of action and “merely instruct[s] Texas courts to conform their
interpretation of Texas law to the existing federal precedent to the extent
that the two bodies of law overlap.”125
Yumilicious demonstrates that, despite the DTPA’s sprawling reach
through approximately forty tie-in statutes,126 courts may not infer that a
115. See Woods, 2016 WL 890676, at *2 (“[T]o the extent that this issue represents an
ambiguity in state law, it further supports the appropriateness of remand.”).
116. Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. BarrieEyeglasses, 819 F.3d 170 (5th Cir. 2016).
117. See generally BUS. & COM. § 51.302 (West 2015).
118. Id.
119. Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C., 819 F.3d at 173, 176.






126. RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CTR. FOR CONSUMER LAW, The Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act in Context: Not All That Bad 32–33 (2009), www.law.uh.edu/peopleslawyer/
2009consumer-law-basics/presentations/RichardAlderman-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FH9M-7DEF].
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statute ties in to the DTPA absent explicit language providing as much.
Standards set forth in the DTPA and in tie-in statutes for purposes of
interpretation and guidance as to what constitutes a deceptive act is not
to be confused with express provisions on what is actionable in and of
itself.
E. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE & DISCOVERY RULE
In Scott v. Furrow, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that real
property records, which do not impute notice on DTPA claimants as a
defense to the merits of a claim, will serve to preclude tolling the DTPA’s
four-year statute of limitations127 pursuant to the discovery rule.128 The
Scott case arose out of the 2006 and 2007 purchase of certain residential
lots in Sequin, Texas, which the plaintiff (Scott) claimed were misrepre-
sented to her as exclusive waterfront-access properties.129 When Scott
sued her real estate broker and his agency (defendants) in 2013, the de-
fendants sought and won summary judgment in the trial court based, in
part, on the grounds that Scott brought her claims after the statute of
limitations had run.130 Scott argued on appeal that the discovery rule
tolled the limitations window, citing Ojeda de Toca v. Wise, where the
Texas Supreme Court “ascertain[ed] no intent on the part of the legisla-
ture to bar DTPA or fraud actions because an examination of county
records would have disclosed the seller’s deception.”131 The court of ap-
peals, however, rejected Scott’s contention and held that “we conclude
the holding in Wise prevents a defendant from using imputed notice from
the deed records as a direct defense against a DTPA claim but not from
relying on the deed records to establish when a plaintiff should have dis-
covered a claim for limitations purposes.”132
F. BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGEABILITY
In In re Dang, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas held that DTPA liability is potentially dischargeable in bankruptcy
absent explicit findings that the debtor’s DTPA liability was the result of
intentional conduct.133 There, the plaintiffs (the Gilberts) sued Anh Van
Dang and Hong Bich Chau (collectively, Dang) in Texas state court for
allegedly failing to disclose mold and water damage issues in a Houston
residence before selling it to them.134 A jury awarded the Gilberts more
than $1.5 million in DTPA damages, including exemplary damages, for
their fraud and unconscionable conduct, though the jury did not find spe-
127. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004 (West 2002).
128. Scott v. Furrow, No. 04-15-00074-CV, 2016 WL 889473, at *5 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Mar. 9, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
129. Id. at *1.
130. Id.
131. Ojeda de Toca v. Wise, 748 S.W.2d 449, 450 (Tex. 1988).
132. Scott, 2016 WL 889473, at *3.
133. In re Dang, 560 B.R. 287, 292 (S.D. Tex. 2016).
134. Id. at 289.
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cifically on Dang’s intent in committing its unlawful acts.135
Dang and Chau both filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief in proceed-
ings that were consolidated.136 The Gilberts filed an adversary action in
the bankruptcy court for a declaration that the jury verdict was nondis-
chargeable pursuant to federal bankruptcy law, which provides that a
debtor may not discharge a debt incurred as a result of actual fraud.137
The bankruptcy court granted the Gilberts’ summary judgment motion
and found that the entire jury verdict, based on unintentional acts and
implicitly intentional ones, was nondischargeable.138 The district court re-
versed the bankruptcy court’s finding and remanded for a more detailed
determination on which damages flowed from which DTPA claims, rea-
soning that the jury’s award of exemplary damages implies at least some
finding of intentional conduct.139
Dang should sound a note of caution to prevailing DTPA claimants
regarding the importance of explicit jury findings regarding defendants’
intent, especially considering the always-lurking specter of bankruptcy
following large verdicts. Although the district court ultimately corrected
the trial court’s error in failing to apportion damages between intentional
and unintentional acts, much time and expense would no doubt have
been saved had the trial court made explicit findings made the bank-
ruptcy court’s task that much easier at the outset.140
IV. CONCLUSION
The antitrust and DTPA opinions issued during the Survey period
demonstrate that courts continue to hold plaintiffs in such actions to a
high standard of pleadings and proof. Before bringing such a claim, a
party must carefully evaluate whether the plaintiff has the special stand-
ing required by the statutory schemes and how the alleged wrongdoing
does or does not meet the elements of the causes of action. Identifying
and addressing such issues ahead of time, particularly in federal court,
will help the practitioner avoid expending unnecessary resources on
claims that might be better brought under different theories of recovery.
The DTPA cases adjudicated during 2016 generally indicate that both
state and federal courts are keen to enforce inferred limits on the scope
135. Id. at 289–90, 292 (“Question 10 asked if Dang and Chau were actually aware of
the falsity of their representations at issue in Question 5 on statutory fraud. The jury did
not answer the question.”).
136. Id. at 289–90.
137. Id. (discussing 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(6) (2012)).
138. Id. at 289.
139. Id. at 295 ((quoting In re Schwager, 121 F.3d 177, 184 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Here, as in
Schwager, the bankruptcy court must redetermine ‘the dischargeability issues, with specific,
independent factual findings.’”)).
140. Id. at 293 (“[T]he bankruptcy court should not have relied on the conclusory state-
ment in the state court’s final judgment that Dang and Chau committed ‘knowing and
intentional violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act’ to determine that the
entire judgment debt was nondischargeable. . . . The final judgment included no specific
findings of knowledge or intent and did not cite the DTPA provisions the defendants
violated.”).
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of these consumer-protection statutes to preclude, for example, claims
brought by consumers’ heirs and claims brought under theories of im-
plied tie-ins.
